on ecological space, the planet-wide system of systems that influence one another and set the background conditions for human life and civilisation.
In none of these spaces are current tools and institutions of global governance up to the challenges they face. Mass violence in fragile states, cross-border economic shocks and cyber attacks, and the threat of runaway climate change threaten the public, transactional and ecological spaces of human existence. Getting global-governance reform right, however, will require paying close attention to the provision not just of security, but also of justice -and seeing to it that the two are mutually reinforcing.
Just security
Whereas security has always been considered integral to global governance, and to the mission of the United Nations, global justice has not been accorded similar central importance. Yet of the four main aims identified in the preamble to the 1945 UN Charter, only one -'to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war' -is primarily security-focused. The preamble makes it clear that keeping war at bay is a means to other, even greater ends: human rights and dignity, gender equality, social and economic progress, liberty and justice.
Before the UN Charter, the pursuit of security was enshrined in the Covenant of the League of Nations, and, before that, at least in one part of the world, in the Concert of Europe. The notion of justice emerged more resolutely in deliberations at the global level with the charter, a result of the insight that to truly defeat the scourge of war, collective or common security alone is not enough. Unless both security and justice are guaranteedreflecting humanity's yearning not only to survive but to thrive with dignity -neither security nor justice is sustainable over the medium to long term.
Security is merely the appearance of order, in a framework of structural violence, unless it is tempered or leavened by concepts of justice that include human rights, human dignity and other normative limits on the use of power. The pursuit of justice, in turn, is crippled if it is not backed up by the requisite means to maintain order. The intersection between security and justice, or 'just security', is an essential element of any global-governance enterprise or architecture. Security enhances justice by creating stable conditions -social, economic and political -for justice to take root and flourish; bringing greater urgency to justice goals, by stressing close links with immediate security concerns; and helping make advances in justice irreversible. Justice reinforces security by addressing many of the root causes of insecurity at different levels of governance (such as inequality, lack of transparency, corruption and authoritarianism); 2 balancing the short-termism of many security imperatives with the medium-to long-term considerations of justice; and helping to expand the constituency for security promotion to a broader range of public-and private-sector actors.
Of course, security and justice also differ in several ways. Security promotion tends to be a status-quo-oriented endeavour, although the status quo a security institution aims to defend post-conflict and post-reform may be different than that which its predecessor institutions promoted. Once set in motion, however, security promotion tends to have considerable institutional momentum and affinity for functional stability. Institutions of justice can also be highly conservative -procedurally and politically -but justice promotion itself is more often viewed, at least by its supporters, as progressive and potentially transformational. It is therefore often contentious, and may be seen as a threat to social elites. Security-sector reform and postconflict peacebuilding can be seen as ways to make security and stability supportive of transformational aspects of justice.
Global-security imperatives (such as prosecuting the 'global war on terror' and removing the threat of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons)
can undermine the promotion of justice at the local level -for example, when civilians are affected directly by economic sanctions and military actions.
Justice and security are rarely considered equal in any given situation, such as when force protection takes precedence over building rule-of-law institutions because it is less risky for the intervening external actors. In cases where short-term trade-offs favour security and the promotion of stability, the goal should be to return to balance as quickly as possible, with justice 
Emerging global-governance actors
As the United Nations enters its eighth decade, the world is less Westphalian than ever. Indeed, it is more appropriate to speak not of one, but of at least three United Nations, consisting of the member states, the secretariat and UN bureaucracy, and independent, yet UN-affiliated, civil-society organisations.
3 These and other actors are assuming an increasingly prominent role within the wider global-governance architecture. They can serve both as contributors to and as detractors from security and justice. Agenda. 8 Governance of the internet, similarly, has always been a multistakeholder, multilevel enterprise with governments as collaborators, but not controlling partners, of a global network that is 90% privately owned.
State fragility and political violence
The problems of fragile states and their 'ungoverned' spaces (that is, areas under the control of private militias, terrorist groups or no one in particular) are not just domestic. 9 They tend to cascade disorder into neighbouring states. They can be used as transit zones by drug or human traffickers and are prone to having their resources looted for international markets.
The World Bank Institute calculates that more than 1.5 billion people live in countries affected by fragility and conflict, and more than half of those people live in poverty, compared with 22% for all low-income countries taken together. Conflict-affected states are some of the least developed in the world. and institutions make greater efforts to bring women into conflict mediation, peace negotiations and processes of peace implementation, as they are better placed to address women's differential experiences of conflict and their concerns for and interests in rebuilding sustainable peace.
Over the past two decades, the United Nations, NATO, the European Union, the African Union and other regional organisations have undertaken peacekeeping and stabilisation operations (the latter where peace must be created and then kept). Most peacekeepers have deployed under the UN flag. In the vast majority of new operations over the past quarter-century, UN forces have faced one or more armed groups either not a party to major peace accords or otherwise inclined to use force against the UN. The need to keep upwards of 90,000 troops and 13,000 police in the field in eight complex operations for years at a time -rotating and replacing contingents on a regular basis every six to 12 months and coping with increasingly dangerous operating environments -has placed the UN's peacekeeping system under extraordinary stress. The comparable peak period in the 1990s lasted less than three years, as did the average complex operation.
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Today's operations are more likely to last seven to ten years in equally unstable environments. 12 Nor is it clear that demand has peaked. Thus far, no complex peacekeeping operation has ever deployed in the Middle East or North Africa (we count the seven-year US presence in Iraq as occupation and counter-insurgency, rather than peacekeeping). Yet Libya could hardly be worse off than it is today, riven and politically adrift, if international forces had been present from the start of NATO's operations there to provide impartial on-the-ground security and to encourage regional militias to return home and disband. Nor, given the tidal wave of refugees presently crashing against European shores, is it clear that denial of all but palliative care in regards to the Syrian civil war has brought about better results in terms of either security or justice than more resolute external support to forces opposing a regime clearly in egregious breach of its R2P obligations, or at least much greater pressure on the regime itself. to visit will eventually visit you. And they will use GPS-enabled phones and downloadable maps to do so, after involuntarily contributing substantial amounts to the growing wealth of organised criminal traffickers, and losing family members in the process. The absence of positive support to peacepreventive or corrective -means greater leeway for the forces of disorder.
To improve UN capacity to deploy well-trained troops and police in peace operations, the report of the Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance, 'Confronting the Crisis of Global Governance', recommended earmarking select member-state military units and formed police units for UN service on a rolling basis; doubling UN military-planning capacity; expanding the UN's standing capacity to deploy individual police officers and civilian experts by a factor of ten; and establishing a police and civilian reserve capacity able to staff up the management capacity of new operations in a matter of weeks rather than months. 13 But the interests of the global community, neighbouring states and the country confronting its own crisis of governance could be better met were the international and regional community also better able to effect conflict-prevention measures, which means developing better early warning and understanding of conflict drivers. Post-conflict, the same pool of knowledge could contribute to rebuilding and, with luck, transforming the underlying causes of conflict to support sustainable peace.
War-torn societies need more than one kind of post-conflict justice. They need legal or retributive justice, acknowledgement of wrongdoing, socioeconomic justice (in the form of compensation for injury or loss) and political justice (meaning democratic accountability, as well as public policy and services). 14 Peacebuilders should also be especially sensitive to the fact that building government legitimacy in the eyes of society requires anticorruption strategies built into capacity-building programmes, giving equal emphasis to personal and institutional integrity and ways to incentivise it.
Reducing corruption is essential to building effective rule of law. 16 These shocks to the global economic system have threatened the very fabric of national economies, the often delicate social contract between governments and their citizens, and the personal and material security of individual citizens.
Global financial and economic volatility
As the public discourse on Greece and the eurozone, and Thomas
Piketty's popular work Capital in the Twenty-First Century on wealth distribution, both show, considerations of economic insecurity can quickly spill over into concern for key principles of justice, such as fairness, inequality and participation in governance. 17 The International Labour Organisation (ILO) estimated that the global number of unemployed in 2009 was about 34m higher than in 2007. 18 By 2013, the global economy was still falling about 4m jobs short of keeping pace with the growth in the labour force. 19 Economic crises and inequality have worldwide spillover effects, as young people continue to face grim employment prospects. This has implications both for the scale of economic migration and for the potential attractiveness of extremist narratives offering place and purpose, however destructive, to those unable to find constructive alternatives. 20 The risks of another global financial meltdown -amplified by poorly regulated markets for securities and currencies, as well as diverging interest rates and monetary policies in major economies -remains high. Secondly, the G20+ would lend support to, and introduce financial and other incentives for, countries and regions that sustain financial and economic regulatory reform and renewal, while reducing economic nationalism.
In support of these aims, it would promote transparency for all economic and financial actors and activities, as well as appropriate regulation and supervision. Finally, the G20+ would better respond to cross-border economic crises by leveraging far closer ties to the UN to enhance coordination (including technical and financial resources) between UN member states, global economic bodies, and regional and other development banks, including, as they gain experience, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the BRICS Development Bank.
To ensure greater institutionalised coordination between the G20+ countries, the 193 UN member states, and representatives of major global and regional economic bodies, the G20+ should meet at the heads-of-state level every two years at UN headquarters. In alternate years, the G20+ would continue to meet in the country of a particular year's rotating president.
Whereas the chief policy focus of the G20+ should remain priority-setting Downloaded by [Richard Ponzio] at 13:58 29 July 2016 on critical issues for the world economy, including in the area of crisis response, it should depend on formal international organisations and states for implementation and follow-through. To support the periodic meetings in New York and basic levels of coordination and exchange among the secretariats of global economic bodies, a light global economic-cooperation liaison mechanism should be created, involving senior staff from the G20+, the UN, and other major global and regional economic bodies. The justsecurity logic in this proposal holds that the G20+ could and should focus on financial stabilisation and crisis avoidance, while working with its partners and through co-memberships to develop policies and strategies that aim to reduce economic inequality and build job opportunities. In turn, the broader aim would be to reverse the troubling global trend of decreasing confidence in governments.
Climate change and human livelihoods
The global climate is a priori beyond the reach of any single state to manage. Since the inaugural IPCC report in 1990, periodic updates have continued to deepen the scientific consensus around the nature, causes and effects of a changing global climate. In the IPCC's most recent assessment report, its fifth, the findings are most dramatic. Greenhouse-gas (GHG) levels are the highest they have been in more than 800,000 years, and rates of increase are the highest in 22,000. Global temperatures are predicted to rise more than 2°C above pre-industrial levels by 2100 unless global GHG emissions are pushed 40-70% lower by 2050 than they were in 2010, and fall to zero by 2100. Geoengineering (also called climate engineering) is a drastic yet appealing option to face these threats. 26 It refers to strategies that try to alter the climate system through direct human intervention, broadly divided into 
